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MARKET ANALYSIS OF NEW-GENERATION 
MEDICINES FOR HEPATITIS C 
2014 was a revolution for the cure of hepatitis c with the appearance of new-
generation medicines in the market.  
 
This new medicines, led by Sovaldi, have increased significantly  the cure rates of 
old treatments, reduced side effects and length of treatments and generated a 
big controversy due to its high prices. 
 
 To reflect the current situation of the market of medicines for hepatitis c and analyze the facts which have occurred under an economic point of 
view. 
 To identify the three different players (patients, payers and industry) in this game and understand the drivers of their behavior. 
 
2. INTRODUCTION 
1. OBJECTIVES 
1. The virus of hepatitis c has six different genotypes (genetic structures). 
Genotype 1 is the most common one in the wealthy countries and the most 
difficult one to treat 
2. There are more than 10 million patients of hepatitis c in these wealthy countries 
3. There are three important factors in the treatment of the disease: cure rate, 
length of treatment and side effects 
 
3. KEY ASPECTS 
4. OLD vs NEW TREATMENTS 
Old treatments used to be the double therapy, composed of interferon and rivabirin, and the 
triple therapy, which involves the addition of a third drug: telaprevir or boceprevir. 
New treatments that came in 2014 were Olysio® and Sovaldi® The final optimal treatments for 
hepatitis c genotype 1 patients is the combination of Olysio and Sovaldi  in an interferon-free 
treatment with an effectiveness of around 95% 
5. MARKET ANALYSIS 
1. THE PATIENTS 
 
Since the appearance of the new medicines, the patients 
have been carrying out lots of demonstrations and protests 
trying to get the new medicines. We can explain their 
situation by using the concept of utility. 
 
 
 
 
qi: represents the quality of the medicine taken by the  
patient 
qmax : the maximum quality available in the market 
Β: is a subjective factor which reflects the perception of the 
patient about how good the treatment he receives is taking 
into account the available treatments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before Sovaldi, traditional treatments got a utility equal to  
qold, but now they do not receive this utility but a lower one. 
Why? Due to the factor 𝛽(q𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑡 − 𝑞𝑖). The feeling of inequality      
caused by the difference in qualities reduces the utility     
perceived by them. This makes them feel discriminated (in 
greater or lesser extent depending on the individual) and  
with the perception that they are worse off even though, 
technically (or medically) speaking, they are in the same 
situation as before. 
This simple explanation can help to explain the observed  
reaction of the patients, their demonstrations and strong 
efforts pressuring the Government to get Sovaldi and why   
the topic has become so popular occupying lots of hours on 
TV. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  2. THE PAYER 
 
This group is represented by the Government, and its analysis      
is divided in two perspectives: the short and the long term. 
 
The short term perspective 
 
What do Governments do in first instance? Differences in  
costs  between old and new treatments. 
 
In the US, a typical 12-week treatment course of simeprevir 
when used  with a total of 24-weeks of peginterferon plus 
ribavirin will cost approximately $85,000.  
 
A 12-week course of simeprevir plus sofosbuvir costs 
approximately $150,000 
 
That makes a difference of $65,000 per patient. Multiplied by   
the 140 thousand patients that are currently being treated in     
US (and supposes just a 9% of total population infected) we 
have an increase of $9,100,000,000. More than 9 billion   
dollars extra.  
 
The long term perspective 
 
Next thing the Governments will consider is whether the 
treatment is worth it or not. How can we measure this?  
The quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) is a measure of disease 
burden, including both the quality and the quantity of life 
lived.  It is used in assessing the value for money of a medical 
intervention. The idea is simple: it consists on multiplying the 
extra life years after the intervention by the quality of those 
years. A perfect health would receive a value equal to 1, 
while a year of life lived in a state of less than this perfect 
health is worth less than 1. 
 
Many reports have been carried on based on this tool, and 
almost all of them agree that Sovaldi (and, by extension, all 
the new generation medicines) is worth it, that means, 
treating all patients is cost effective. 
 
So Governments find themselves in front of an uncomfortable 
situation: Sovaldi is cost-effective but they can’t afford it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. THE INDUSTRY 
 
In 2014, the market was dominated by the combination 
Sovaldi-Olysio, but in 2015 a new medicine entered the 
market: Harvoni® 
This new drug has the same function as previous combination 
but in one single pill, and has the characteristic that it was 
developed by Sovaldi’s patent owner Gilead Sciences. Why 
did Gilead Sciences did such investment if they already had 
half of the monopoly? Is it really worth it? And how is the 
market reacting to this new model of competition? 
 
Before Harvoni was launched, the patients faced the 
following situation: a double monopoly by Sovaldi and Olysio. 
Both monopolies calculated their prices in an attempt to 
maximize their profits. However, both drugs have to be 
consumed together. 
To exlain the consequences of this double monopoly on 
perfect complementary goods, let us consider a 
representative consumer that includes the patient wellbeing 
as well as the costs of the treatment. This representative 
consumer will have to consume the same quantity of both 
drugs QT= min {𝑞𝑠
∗, 𝑞𝑜
∗}. Hence, if the patients need to consume 
both products, the demand of the composite drug will be 
 
 
Where Sovaldi (similarly Olysio) will maximize with respect to ps 
the profit function: 
 
 
 
If a single monopolist would be selling the composite drug in 
the market, then firms will maximize the total profits 
 
 
Solving both problems we reach to the next conclusions: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Price of Harvoni is lower than the combination 
2. The quantity sold of Harvoni is higher 
3. The profits for the single monopolist are larger 
 
Double marginalization problem: a firm selling a composite 
drug will make more profits not only than that of the firms 
selling one component but also more than both of them 
together. This provides strong incentives to develop such a 
composite drug. 
1. The market of medicines for hepatitis c has followed a normal evolution from a double monopoly towards a more efficient form of a unique monopoly. This situation 
is expected to keep on evolving as long as more competitors enter the market. 
 
2. The origin of the conflict which has made this issue of national interest for the media lies in that all the three players have very different goals and the problem 
comes when discussing about how much of the new welfare generated should correspond to each part. 
 
3. Thus, we cannot talk in here about victims and perpetrators, but to learn from this process to be able to face problems that will come in the future: the importance 
of investing in R&D and the necessity of the payers of developing effective forms of negotiation that will balance the value in favor of the patients they represent 
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